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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATI'. uK ill AH 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
•\i> 
RICHARD ARTHUR CHAMBEKb, 
Defendant-Responden • 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No 
13845 
S T A T E M E N T OF 
N A T U R E O F T H E CASE 
Oris is an appeal from a final order of the Honor-
able VeNoy Christoffersen granting defendant's motion 
for expungement and denying appellant's motion for 
stay of the expungement order. 
D I S P O S I T I O N • M i Hi- M>\\ h i t COURT 
The lower court, over appellant's timely objection, 
granted defendant's expungement motion and further 
denied appellant's motion to stay said order on Septem-
ber 4, 1974. 
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R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
Appellant requests that the lower court's expunge-
ment order be reversed or that said court be ordered to 
stay execution of said order. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
Defendant Richard Arthur Chambers, while Mayor 
of Logan City, was charged in ten different criminal 
complaints with sixteen counts of misusing public mon-
ies in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-26-59 (1953); 
seven counts of grand larceny; one count of making a 
profit of public monies; and one count of forgery. As 
a result of communication between defendant's attorney, 
Walter G. Mann, and the Cache County Attorney, 
B. H . Harris, it was agreed that if defendant would 
plead guilty to making a profit out of public monies, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-28-61 and 62 
(1953), Criminal Number 1372, and misusing public 
funds, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-28-29(9) 
(1953), Criminal Number 1372, the other charges 
would not be prosecuted, Pursuant to said agreement, 
on April 4, 1972, defendant plead guilty to the criminal 
counts set forth above. H e stated that no promises had 
been made to him regarding his plea (T. 13). Defen-
dant's guilty plea was accepted and he was subsequently 
sentenced on May 4, 1972, to the indeterminate term in 
the Utah State Prison from zero to five years and placed 
on probation on condition that he serve concurrent one 
year terms in the Box Elder County Jail. 
On July 2, 1974, the Cache County Attorney was 
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notified by defendant of the latter's intention to peti-
tion for withdrawal of guilty plea and expungement of 
record. The Cache County Attorney filed an objection 
to the defendant's motion stating that an expungement 
could not be had until five years after release from 
incarceration or probation in the case of a felony. I t was 
uncontroverted that defendant was released from pro-
bation on October 9, 1974 (T. 21). The lower court 
granted the expungement motion on July 8, 1974. Ap-
pellant, on July 22, 1974, subsequently motioned the 
lower court to stay execution of its expungement order 
for five years so as to comply with provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-35-17.5 (1953). The lower court denied 
this motion on September 4,1974. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED ERROR 
IN HOLDING THAT THE PROVISIONS 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-17.5 (1953), 
WERE INAPLICABLE IN THIS ACTION. 
In 1973, the Utah State Legislature revised the 
law regarding expungement of criminal records, in 
effect, requiring the passage of five years from the date 
of release from incarceration or probation before a court-
ordered expungement could be accomplished. The lower 
court determined that to require defendant to wait five 
years as provided by the legislature would submit defen-
dant to an ex post facto law. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"This particular statute (Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-35-17.5 (1953)), was enacted in the 
1973 Legislature. That was after the convic-
tion above listed. The court holds that this 
particular section requiring five years period 
after felony conviction applies to any convic-
tions after the date of the effectiveness or the 
effective date of Section 77-35-17.5. Since the 
statute itself states that any person who has 
been convicted in this state may petition the 
convicting court for a judicial pardon and 
expungement of the record, the court holds 
that this is only effective for the conviction of 
those persons after that date; if the conviction 
occurred prior to the effective date, then you 
use 77—or the provisions of 77-35-17. You 
cannot enlarge after a conviction either a pen-
alty or an additional requirement that was not 
there prior to the conviction." (T. 21). 
The lower court erred in its finding the five year 
waiting period could not be evoked because it would 
constitute the imposition of an ex post facto law. The 
very definition of an ex post facto law precludes the 
statute here in question from that category. As stated 
by the United States Supreme Court in the case of 
Colder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 3 U.S. 386 (1798), an ex 
post facto law includes "Every law that changes the 
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the 
law annexed to the crime when committed." Id. at 390. 
The statute here in question does not fall within this 
definition. Defendant's punishment is not, nor would 
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it have been, increased or changed in an ex post facto 
sense. 
At the time of his conviction and subsequent sen-
tencing defendant had certain rights or expectations. 
H e had a right to be released upon completion of his 
sentence. H e had a right after sentencing to be free 
from imposition of greater punishment than that pre-
scribed by the sentencing court. I t should be noted, 
however, that no right existed in defendant to have his 
criminal record expunged upon the successful comple-
tion of his sentence. The expungement law in effect at 
the time of defendant's conviction was discretionary in 
nature: 
" . . . Where it appears to the court from 
the report of the probation agent in charge of 
the defendant, or otherwise, that the defendant 
has complied with the conditions of such pro-
bation, the court may if it be compatible with 
the public interest either upon motion of the 
district attorney or of its own motion terminate 
the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or 
conviction of the defendant, and dismiss the 
action and discharge the defendant." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-35-17 (1953). (Emphasis 
added. 
The discretionary nature of the statute removes the 
statute from that category of statutes which increase or 
decrease the punishment of the accused after the con-
viction. 
No promise was made to defendant regarding ex-
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pungement at the time his pleas of guilty were entered. 
Defendant therefore could not maintain that he had a 
right to expungement as a result of said pleas. 
The erroneous holding of the lower court that de-
fendant's punishment would be increased by the imposi-
tion of the five year waiting period requires a further 
equally erroneous finding that all convicted persons 
have as part of their sentence the enforceable right to 
expungement upon successful completion of their sen-
tence. No such right exists. Rather, as previously stated, 
the process of expungement is a discretionary act of 
grace on the part of the court to be exercised as directed 
by the legislature. 
Abundant case law exists which supports the 
proposition here advanced by appellant, that changes in 
procedures which affect acts of grace are not subject 
to the ex post facto prohibition. In Graham v. Thomp-
son, 246 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1957), an inmate charged 
that the repeal of the "good time" statute in effect at 
the time of his conviction and the subsequent enactment 
of a new "good time" statute which provided less allow-
ance for "good time" constituted the imposition of an 
ex post facto law. The Tenth Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court's judgment which granted petitioner's writ, 
saying: 
"I t seems quite apparent that regardless 
of the statute in effect when the petitioner 
committed the crime and was sentenced, the 
good time allowances provided therein were 
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not part of his sentence and thus not part of 
the law annexed to the crime, when committed. « 
His right to the allowances was within the 
discretion of the Board of Pardons as a matter 
of grace. The allowances are not mandatory 
or of right, and are only guides to the authority 
of the Utah Board of Pardons, which it may 
accept, or reject. A legislative change of that 
guide would not affect a prisoner's sentence 
and would have no ex post facto application. 
The rule is correctly stated in 16A C.J.S. 
Constitutional Law § 444, as follows: Where 
an allowance for good behavior is regarded 
as a right, a statute which may have the effect 
of depriving a convicted person of such right 
is ex post facto; but the rule is otherwise where 
a shortened term for good behavior is regarded 
as a matter of grace, and not of right.' " Id. 
at 807. 
Also see Voorhees v. Cox, 140 F.2d 132 (1944), cert, 
den. 322 U.S. 733 (1944); Lindsley v. Board of Man-
agers of New Jersey State Prison, 151 A. 294, 107 
N.J . Law 51 (1930); People ex rel. Kleinger v. Wilson, 
254 App. Div. 406, 5 N.Y. Supp. 2d 934 (1938); 60 
Am.Jur. Penal and Correctional Institutions, § 60; 95 
A.L.R.2d 1265, 1290 § 16. 
This honorable court has followed the majority view 
that in matters of discretion or grace the ex post facto 
law prohibition does not apply. See Cardisco v. Davis, 
91 Utah 323, 64 P.2d 216 (1937); McCoy v. Harris, 
108 Utah 407,160 P.2d 721 (1945). 
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Appellant submits that the rule of law stated in 
the above cases is direcrtly on point. While the case at 
bar involves a change in the procedure through which 
expungement may be accomplished after convictions, 
here as in the cases cited, no right of the defendant has 
been affected. The legislative modification merely in-
structed the court that in performing this discretionary 
act of judicial grace, the effective date of such action 
should be no less than five years from the defendant's 
release from incarceration. Since defendant's right would 
not have been abridged nor would his punishment have 
been increased, the lower court erroneously expunged 
Chambers' criminal record and refused to grant appel-
lant's motion for stay of execution. 
POINT II 
THE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE OF UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 77-35-17.5 (1953), MUST BE 
GIVEN AFFECT IN EXPUNGEMENT PRO-
CEEDINGS. 
I t is a well established rule of statutory construc-
tion that special statutes or special statutory language 
controls general language. This rule was set forth by 
this court in the case of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake 
County, 60 Utah 423, 209 P . 207 (1922), quoting: 
"Further, it is an elementary doctrine that, 
where two statutes treat of the same subject 
matter, the one general and the other special 
in its provisions, the special provisions control 
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the general. State ex rel Morck v. White, 41 
Utah 480, 126 Pac. 330; Nelden v. Clark, 20 
Utah, 382, 59 Pac. 524, 77 Am. St. Rep. 917; 
University of Utah v. Richards, 20 Utah 457, 
59 Pac. 96, 77 Am.St. Rep. 928; Crane v. 
Reeder, 22 Mich. 322." Id. at 427. 
Also see State eoc rel. Johnson v. Alexander, 87 Utah 
378, 49 P.2d 408 (1935); State v. Burnham, 87 Utah 
445, 49 P.2d 963 (1935). 
With regard to the case at bar, the authorities cited 
above require that the general language of Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-35-17 (1953), be superseded by the specific 
expungement language of Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-17.5 
(1953). An examination of Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-
17.5 (1953), leaves no question but that the legislature 
has specified that an expungement order may not be 
issued until five years after the parties released from 
incarceration in the case of a felony or indictable mis-
demeanor or one year in the case of a misdemeanor: 
" (1) Any person who has been convicted 
of any crime within the state may petition the 
convicting court for a judicial pardon and for 
the expungement of his record in that court. 
At the time the petition is filed, the court shall 
set a date for a hearing and notify the prosecut-
ing attorney for the jurisdiction of the pen-
dency of the petition and of the date set for the 
hearing. Any person who may have relevant 
information about the petitioner may testify 
at the hearing and the court, in its discretion, 
may request a written evaluation of the adult 
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parole and probation section of the Utah divi-
sion of corrections. 
(2) If the court finds that the petitioner 
for a period of five years in the case of an in-
dictable misdemeanor or felony, or for a period 
of one year in the case of a misdemeanor, since 
his release from incarceration or probation, has 
not been convicted of a felony or of a misde-
meanor involving moral turpitude and that no 
proceeding involving such a crime is pending or 
being instituted against the petitioner and, 
further, finds that the rehabilitation of the peti-
tioner has been attained to the satisfaction of 
the court, it shall enter an order that all records 
in the petitioner's case in the custody of that 
court or in the custody of any other court, 
agency or official, be sealed. 
(3) Upon the entry of the order in those 
proceedings, the petitioner shall be deemed 
judicially pardoned and the petitioner may 
thereafter respond to any inquiries relating to 
convictions of crimes as though that conviction 
never occurred. 
(4) Copies of that order shall be sent to 
each court, agency or official named in the 
order. 
(5) Inspection of the records shall there-
after be permitted by the court only upon 
petition by the person who is the subject of 
those records and only to the persons named 
in that petition." Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-17.5 
(1953). 
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The general language of section 77-35-17, Utah 
Code Ann. (1953) fails to even mention expungement: 
"Upon a plea of guilty or conviction of 
any crime or offense, if it appears compatible 
with the public interest, the court having juris-
diction may suspend the imposition or the ex-
ecution of sentence and may place the defen-
dant on probation for such period of time as 
the court shall determine. 
The court may subsequently increase or 
decrease the probation period, and may revoke 
or modify any condition of probation. While 
on probation, the defendant may be required 
to pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed 
at the time of being placed on probation; may 
be required to make restitution or reparation 
to the aggravated party or parties for the 
actual damages or losses caused by the offense 
to which the defendant has pleaded guilty or 
for which conviction was had; and may be re-
quired to provide for the support of his wife 
or others for whose support he may be legally 
liable. Where it appears to the court from the 
report of the probation agent in charge of the 
defendant, or otherwise, that the defendant 
has complied with the conditions of such proba-
tion, the court may if it be compatible with the 
public interest either upon motion of the dis-
trict attorney or of its own motion terminate 
the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or 
conviction of the defendant and dismiss the 
action and discharge the defendant." 
Appellant is aware of the judicial interpretation 
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of section 77-35-17, Utah Code Ann. (1953), giving 
expungement power to the courts but submits that no-
where in that statute are the courts specifically em-
powered to ''expunge". 
The absence of specific language in Section 77-35-
17 regarding expungement and the presence of such 
language in Section 77-35-17.5 clearly demonstrates 
the legislative intent that any expungement accompli-
shed after the effective date of the latter legislation 
should be in accordance with the procedure therein set 
forth. 
POINT III 
THE EXPUNGEMENT ORDER OF THE 
LOWER COURT WAS NOT COMPATIBLE 
WITH THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND 
SHOULD THEREFORE BE REVERSED. 
Even if it is assumed that the provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-35-17 (1953), were properly invoked, 
the lower court's action in ordering expungement of 
defendant's criminal record did not meet the require-
ments of said section. As provided, a court may initiate 
the expungement proceedings provided for in Section 
77-35-17 only if the same is "compatible with the public 
interest": 
" . . . Where it appears to the court from 
the report of the probation agent in charge 
of the defendant, or otherwise, that the defen-
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dant has complied with the conditions of such 
probation, the court may if it be compatible 
with the public interest either upon motion 
of the district attorney or of its own motion, 
terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of 
guilty or conviction of the defendant, and dis-
miss the action and discharge the defendant." 
(Emphasis added.) 
The public interest was in no manner served by the ex-
pungement order of the lower court. The case at bar 
involves the holder of the highest office of trust in 
Logan City. Defendant violated that confidence by 
committing criminal acts directed at those very individ-
uals who through the electorial process elevated defen-
dant to a position of esteem and trust. The penalty that 
follows those who violate such a trust should not be so 
soon erased or forgotten. At the time the lower court 
ordered expungement, a mere two and one half years 
had passed since the discovery of defendant's criminal 
acts. Appellant submits that the public interest is not 
served in cleansing so radiply the record of the criminal 
acts here involved. 
Defendant would have this Court believe that he 
has suffered enough and that his punishment should now 
be terminated. Appellant disagrees. Defendant would 
have this Court overlook the fact that he was charged 
with sixteen counts of misusing public monies and seven 
counts of grand larceny and that all but two of these 
criminal counts contained in the ten criminal complaints 
filed, were dropped on the proviso that a plea of guilty 
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would be entered. Appellant submits that the defendant 
in this action has been more than fairly dealt with by 
society. To further delute societal sanctions by expung-
ing defendant's record, a mere two and one half years 
after the commission of these deplorable crimes, would 
certainy work a disservice on society. 
Finally, appellant submits that the credibility of 
our state's and county's judicial system is severely 
damaged in the eyes of the public when courts give the 
appearance of granting special treatment to public offi-
cials convicted of crimes as opposed to average citizens 
convicted of crimes, and that the action taken by the 
lower court in this matter is clearly not "compatible 
with the public interest" as prescribed in Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-35-17 (1953). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant submits that the lower court erroneously 
ordered the expungement of defendant's record and 
therefore the order should be reversed or the present 
action should be remanded with instructions to stay exe-
cution of the order. 
Respectfully submitted, 
V E R N O N B. R O M N E Y 
Attorney General 
E A R L F . D O R I U S 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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